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INTRODUCTION

The recent unsuccessful prosecution of highly regarded criminal defense lawyer Patrick Hallinan I and the indictment of six American lawyers along with
members of the Cali cocaine drug carteJ2 have renewed concerns that the United
States Attorney's office has targeted for prosecution aggressive criminal defense lawyers. A significant majority of the criminal defense bar believes that
the government targets members of the defense bar in order to deter them from
vigorously representing their clients. 3
This essay reviews those cases but does not resolve claims of governmental
overreaching. Instead, this essay accepts as a premise that lawyers attract the
attention of federal prosecutors because of the power and influence that they
exert in American society. A United States Attorney may believe that successful prosecution of highly visible attorneys will give maximum deterrent impact
to the criminal law. Everyone is watching.

t Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law; B.A., Swarthmore College, 1969; J.D. , University of
Pennsylvania, 1974. I wish to thank McGeorge Law student Carolyn Bunon for her excellent research
assistance.
I. See discussion infra at notes 16-36.
2. See discussion infra at notes 37-52.
3. William J. Genego, The New Adversa ry, 54 BROOK.L. Rev. 781, 812 (1988).
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If lawyers are of special interest to the government, there may be other justifications for that attention: lawyers hold special power and have a duty to live
up to special obligations to maintain the public trust. 4 The profession has lost
public trust from Watergate through sleazy public advertising all the way to the
O.J. Simpson trial. The local bar associations do not appear up to the task of
effectively policing their own.
Given that the government may have incentive to investigate professionals,
lawyers ought to be aware of how they may become federal criminal defendants. This essay does not canvass all of the ways in which lawyers may violate
federal criminal law. That task is monumentaJ.5 Instead, this essay touches on
a theme suggested by the popular author John Grisham.
In Grisham's best selling novel, The Firm, hero, Mitch McDeere, is able to
topple his corrupt firm, gain the release of his brother from state prison, coax
$750,000 from the federal government, and hold the Mafia at bay, when he
discovers that his firm has been systematically overbilling its clients. No doubt,
most Grisham-reading lawyers marveled at the clever plot device, but found
McDeere's legal theory, that the government could or would indict the lawyers
at Bendini, Lambert & Locke with multiple counts of mail fraud, highly unrealistic. Or so I thought.
Recent headlines prove that life imitates art or that someone at the U.S. Attorney General's office reads Grisham. Clinton associate and the First Lady's
former law partner vvebster Hubbell is only the most prominent defendant in
what now appears to be a common strategy of the government, whereby the
government charges lawyers with mail fraud for overbilling clients. 6 It demonstrates one more "flexible" use of mail fraud to federalize local fraud, especially
surprising in that regulation of the bar has traditionally been a state function
relatively immune from federal regulation. 7
4. See. e.g., United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 ( 1964) (holding that government can prove that
an attorney acted willfully if he "deliberately closed his eyes to facts he had a duty to see."); see MODEL
RULESOF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT.
5. The following are a few of the legal issues that face lawyers in the white collar crime arena: 1)
fighting for one' s fee; see, e.g., Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 ( 1989) (upholding
against a Sixth Amendment challenge the right of the government to forfeit funds that a client seeks to
use to pay attorney's fees); 2) violating federal criminal law by receiving and not reponing a fee in cash
in excess of $10,000; see 26 U.S.C. § 60501; United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, 935 F.2d 501 (2d
Cir. 1991); United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 1994) (upholding requirement to report cash
transaction and client's name); 3) obstructing justice by corruptly persuading client to refuse to testify
by invoking his Fifth Amendment right not to testify and to accept jail sentence when held in contempt
after grant of immunity . See United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 1987).
6. See United States v. Crymes, Hardie & Heer, No. 93-109 (E.D. Cal. 1993); see also Debra
Cassens Moss , Fairchild Guilty Plea, 81 A.B.A. J. 26 (Feb. 1995); Benjamin Wittis, /t Could Happen
to You Too, 138 N.J. L. J., Dec. 19, 1994 (discussion Webster Hubbell's guilty plea to charges of tax
evasion and mail fraud) .
7. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961) (rejecting federal constitutional attacks on
mandatory lawyer membership in state bars); see also GEOFFREYC. HAZARD,JR. ET AL., THE LAw AND
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This essay examines some of the ways in which lawyers can run afoul of the
federal mail fraud statute. 8 In addition to overbilling, 9 it also reviews a more
general theory relied on by the government whereby a breach of a fiduciary
duty may become actionable as a deprivation of an intangible right to loyal
service. 10 This essay also examines consequences that flow if one commits a
number of acts of mail fraud. Simply stated, mail fraud provides the predicate
for a RIC0 11 indictment or, even if the government reserves RICO for bigger
fish, a private right of action for treble damages and attorneys' fees. 12
Lawyers and lay observers of the justice system often scoff at the lack of
enforcement of ethical rules. Local bar associations may be unwilling or ill
equipped to police the profession. But this essay discusses a far greater deterrent than punishment by the local bar association. It examines how easily lawyers may cross the line between practicing law and violating federal law.
II.

WHY

ARE

LAWYERS

GETTING

PARANOID?

In 1988, the Brooklyn Law Review published a study based on a nationwide
survey of 4,000 criminal defense lawyers. The survey "asked questions about
government practices that directly affect attorneys in their representation of
criminal defendants including the frequency of the government practices, and
the effect the practices have upon criminal defense representation." 13
Eighty percent of the attorneys believed that the Justice Department targeted
attorneys to deter them from zealously representing their clients. 14 Two thirds
of the attorneys responding to the survey reported that they had some contact
with the government relating to their law practice. "Among the specific practices inquired about were the receipt of grand jury subpoenas, the receipt of
summonses from the Internal Revenue Service, the government's use of confidential informants at defense meetings, attempts to forfeit fees paid attorneys or
to prevent a defendant from using assets to pay attorneys' fees, and efforts to
disqualify an attorney from representing a particular defendant." 15
ETHICSOF LAWYERING
855- 69 (2d ed. 1994) (describing historical role of bar in regulating practice of
law).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (]988). The statute was recently amended to include the use of private carriers
who do business in interstate commerce. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-332, l 08 Stat. I 796.
9. See discussion infra at notes 74-111 .
10. See discussion infra at notes 112-34.
11. Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (providing for treble damages and attorneys' fees).
13. See Genego, supra note 3, at 788.
14. See Genego, supra note 3, at 812.
15. See Genego, supra note 3, at 806.
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The recent prosecution of prominent criminal defense lawyer Patrick Hallinan lends some support to the claim that the government abuses its power to
deter zealous representation.
A.

CHARGES

AGAINST

PATRICK

HALLINAN

On March 7, 1995, Patrick Hallinan was acquitted of all drug conspiracy and
obstruction of justice charges brought against him by the United States District
Attorney's office in Reno, Nevada. 16 Hallinan's acquittal came after the jury
deliberated for a mere five hours. The prosecution's case rested primarily on
testimony from drug smugglers, most notably Ciro Mancuso. 17 The jurors discounted the government's witnesses, especially Mancuso, whom the jurors likened to a used car salesman. 18
Hallinan , a well known and well-respected defense attorney, was arrested at
his Marin County home on Friday evening August 6, 1993. 19 Hallinan was
released from custody three days later on $300,000 bond. 2 0 At the time of his
arrest, Hallinan was reading in his library as DEA agents surrounded his home
and burst in with their guns drawn .21 Moments later, Hallinan realized that his
home was not being burglarized, but that the intruders were federal agents and
he was being arrested. 22
The original sixty-two page indictment was filed under seal in Reno on August 4, 1993. The indictment identified Hallinan as counsel to the Mancuso
drug trafficking organization and charged him with thirteen counts of drug importation and trafficking, money laundering and obstruction of justice. 23 More
specifically, the indictment alleged that Hallinan received cardboard boxes filled with cash; advised Mancuso how to launder drug-sale proceeds; and created
a fictitious person to act as the director of a shell corporation to launder Mancuso' s drug money. 24 Most strikingly, however, was an allegation that Hallinan
advised Mancuso to "get rid of" Edwin James Vallier, a witness who was cooperating with law-enforcement officials. 2 s
Further allegations against Hallinan appeared in an affidavit used to support
search warrants for his San Francisco office and his Kentfield residence. Ac16. Howard Mintz, Hallinan Verdict: Total Acquittal, THE REcoRDER, Mar. 8, 1995, at I.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Rob Haeseler, U.S. Reveals Case Against Hallinan Document Says Pot Smugglers Informed on
S.F. Attorney, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 8, 1993, at A21.
20. Id.
21. Maureen Dolan, Putting the Heat on the Defense, L.A. T1MES, May 31, 1994, at I.
22. Id.
23. Victoria Slind-Flor, Defense Lawyers Arrested Forfeiture of Practices Sought, NAT'L L. J., Aug.
23, 1993,at3.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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cording to the affidavit, Hallinan "forwarded hush money to witnesses, helped
Mancuso launder $280,000 by inflating the value of a piece of property in Mexico and then selling it to a smuggling confederate, created a fictitious intermediary to enable Mancuso to bank his drug proceeds offshore, and tipped off two
suspects that they had been secretly indicted so they could flee the country." 26
On July 13, 1994, federal prosecutors in Reno filed a second indictment
against Hallinan which included charges of criminal racketeering. 27 The indictment named Hallinan in twenty of twenty-two counts alleging that he tampered
with witnesses in drug cases, destroyed evidence, concealed the source of drug
proceeds, discouraged clients from cooperating with authorities, advised members of the drug ring to flee the country and told others to lie to the Nevada
grand jury. 28
Shortly after Hallinan's arrest, Jack Sullivan Grellman, a Reno lawyer who
had conducted real estate transactions for Mancuso upon Hallinan's request,
was indicted on three federal counts alleging drug importation, conspiracy and
obstruction of justice. Unlike the arrest of Hallinan, however, Grellman was
allowed to surrender to authorities voluntarily. 29 On the eve of trial, Grellman
pied guilty to one count of money laundering and agreed to testify against
Hallinan. 30
There were sixteen charges pending against Hallinan when jury selection began on January 24, 1995. However, during the course of trial ten charges were
dropped by the prosecution or dismissed by Judge McKibben. 31 Specifically,
Judge McKibben threw out charges of racketeering and racketeering conspiracy. The judge ruled that prosecutors failed to prove the existence of a RICO
enterprise. 32 Thus, by the time the case was submitted to the jury, Hallinan
faced six counts: two counts of conspiracy; three counts of obstruction of justice; and one count of interstate travel to aid racketeering. 33
26. Haeseler, supra note 19, at A2 l.
27. William Cansen, S.F. Lawyer Faces More Charges Patrick Hallinan's Second Indictment, S.F.
CHRON.,July, 16, 1994, at A17.
28. Id.
29. Victoria Slind-Flor, Lawyers Arrest ls Criticized by Colleagues, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 30, 1993, at I.
30. "Grellman admitted that he acted as the Nevada attorney for Keystone Investments, the offshore
shell corporation used by the smugglers' kingpin - Squaw Valley developer Ciro Mancuso - to
launder drug profits." Rob Haeseler, Bombshell as Hallinan Trial Begins Co-Defendant Cops Plea,
Tums State's Evidence, S.F. CHRON.,Jan. 27, 1995, at Al3; Several months later, Grellman was sentenced to four years' probation, ordered to perform 150 hours of community service and to pay a
$5,000 fine. Reno Lawyer Gets Four Years Probation, SACRAMENTO
BEE, May 5, 1995, at B3.
31. Victoria Slind-Flor, Patrick F. Hallinan at Half Time, Some Dismissals, NAr'L L. J., Mar. 6,
1995, at A4.
32. Rob Haeseler, Hallinan Judge Tosses Racketeering Charges, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 22, 1995, at
A20.
33. Sandra Chereb, Acquitted Lawyer Joyful, Still Upset San Francisco Defense Attorney Cleared of
Role in Client's Drug Ring, S.D. UNION-TRIB.,Mar. 9, 1995, at A3. The fact that the court dismissed
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The bulk of the evidence against Hallinan was presented to the jury by Ciro
Mancuso, a confessed drug smuggler who cut a deal with prosecutors in return
for his cooperation. 34 During direct examination, Mancuso testified that "Hallinan told him how to hide drug money, assisted in laundering money and hid
documents at his law office. " 35 This testimony was rejected by the jurors who
likewise discredited testimony given by other drug smugglers. Jurors reported
that "the government's witnesses came across as well-scripted during government examination ... [but that] [d]uring cross-examination, it all fell apart ."36
B. CHARGES

AGAINST

MICHAEL

ABBELL AND WILLIAM

MORAN3 7

A one hundred sixty-one page indictment, unsealed on June 5, 1995, revealed
that federal prosecutors were once again pursuing criminal defense attorneys
alleged to have committed crimes on behalf of their clients. Mindful of the
botched case against Hallinan, federal prosecutors strongly defended the new
indictment and reported that the case was allowed to proceed "only after it was
carefully scrutinized by lawyers at the highest levels of the Justice
Department. " 38
The Miami indictment targeted the notorious Cali drug cartel and six American lawyers "accused of aiding and abetting the Cali cartel in return for stagger ing fees." 39 Specifically, the indictment alleged that the former chief of
international affairs at the Department of Justice, Michael Abbell, secured false
sworn statements from drug smugglers and arranged for payment of attorney's
fees with drug money. 40 It further alleged that William Moran arranged bail for
a drug smuggler he knew would flee. 41 The government also charged Abbell
and Moran with racketeering and participating in a cocaine conspiracy. 42
The Miami indictment charged that lawyers helped to enforce the cartel's
code of silence by passing hush money and/or death threats to arrested employthe charges is certainly some indication that the government's case was weak and was at least overly
eager to charge Hallinan.
34. "In a lucrative plea bargain that Hallinan helped negotiate, Mancuso was allowed to keep millions of dollars, some of which he hid from authorities. He also retained his Lake Tahoe development
company and lives in a [Squaw Valley] mansion." Hallinan I.Awyers Attack Key Witness' Credibility,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. I 0. 1995, at BI.
35. Id.
36. Mintz, supra note 16, at I.
37. Michael Abbell of Washington, D.C.'s Ristau & Abbell is a former high ranking United States
Justice Department official and is considered a leading expert on extradition. William Moran of
Miami's Moran & Gold is a former Dade County assistant state attorney.
38. David Adams, Carrel's I.Awyers, Legal Profession Also on Trial in Miami Series: The Cali
Connection, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. I, 1995, at I A, I B.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Deal May Aid U.S. in Cartel Case, Cm. TRre., July 4, 1995, at 4.
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ees. 43 It is further alleged that Moran and Abbell fingered a confidential informant who was later murdered. 44 Several of the lawyers were also accused of
preparing false legal statements, securing false testimony, and tipping off cartel
members of possible legal action against them. 45 Much of the evidence against
the attorneys consisted of tape-recorded conversations and records seized from
their offices. 46
To date, four of the six lawyers charged by the government have pied guilty
to criminal charges. Three men, Robert Moore, 47 Francisco Laguna 48 and Joel
Rosenthal, 49 pied guilty to reduced charges before the indictment was unsealed.50 The fourth, Donald Ferguson, pied guilty to obstruction of justice and
money laundering shortly thereafter. 51
Prosecutors are confident that the guilty pleas and the testimony of the four
attorneys, unlike the discredited testimony of admitted drug smugglers in the
Hallinan case, will have a tremendous impact on the jury. A federal attorney
involved in the Miami case indicated that we will "absolutely see all or some of
these lawyers testifying in this case because they have all entered pleas, and
whether they will be getting any benefit when it comes to sentencing depends
on their cooperation." s2
C. COUNTERCHARGES

TO THE CHARGES

The arrests of Hallinan and Abbell have renewed concern in the legal community that the government is improperly targeting criminal defense lawyers to
punish zealous lawyers. 53 Many attorneys believe the arrests reflect a dangerous federal policy to fight the war on drugs by fighting a war against the defense attorneys. 54
43. Adams, supra nole 38, at IA, IB .
44. William Booth, Wild Life' s High Price; Miami Vices Lures Drug Dealers Lawyers, WASH. PosT,
June I 3, 1995, at A I.
45. Adams, supra note 38, at IA , IB.
46. David Lyons, Fourth Guilty Plea in Cali Case; Ex-Federal Prosecutor Expected to Tum State's
Evidence, Hous . CHRON.,July 4, 1995, at 8.
47. Moore was "accused of carrying a death threat from Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela, a major cartel
figure, to a cartel manager who was in jail ... [a]uthorities said that Moore told the man that he and his
family would be killed if he cooperated with authorities." Saundra Torry. Case Prompts Lawyers to
Ask Just How Far They Can Go in Defense of Client, WASH. PosT, June 7, 1995, at A6.
48. Laguna, employee of Ristau & Abbell, pied guilty to conspiracy to import cocaine and obstruction of justice. Colluding with the Cali Thugs the Issue: Is Defense Bar Being Targeted? Our View:
Not if Guilty Pleas Mean Anything, ROCKY MouNTAINNEws, June 9, 1995, at 64A.
49. Id. (Rosenthal, former Assistant U.S. Attorney in Miami and New York, pied guilty to money
laundering)
50. Supra note 42, at 4.
51. Id.
52. Stan Yarbro, Miami Drug Prosecutors Tread Carefully, THE RECORDER,June 12, 1995, al I.
53. Dolan, supra note 21, at I.
54. Genego, supra note 3, at 812.
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Federal prosecutors insist that there is no policy to target defense attorneys to
prevent qualified representation of suspected drug distributors. Prosecutors dismiss the "so-called war against the criminal defense as a figment of the lawyers' overwrought imagination and deny claims that they have encouraged
defendants to inform on their lawyers ." 55 According to Assistant U.S. Attorney
Stephen Nelson, lawyers become suspects only when they cross the line from
representation to promoting or facilitating illegal acts. 5 6
In this regard, some attorneys suggest that Hallinan asked for trouble if he in
fact put money that belonged to a client in his personal bank account and created a fictitious officer for an offshore corporation as charged by federal prosecutors. 57 Hallinan admitted that he made mistakes in representing Ciro
Mancuso, mistakes includ ing attending events from weddings to baptisms,
travelling to Mexico with Mancuso, allowing Mancuso, a developer, to build a
nursery for the Hallinans, and selling his mother's home to Mancuso. 58
A closer look at recent arrests of attorneys, however, indicates that the government may be targeting defense attorneys to aid its fight against drugs. For
example, in the case of Patrick Hallinan, critics have been quick to point out
that he was arrested at gun-point late on a Friday evening, thus ensuring that he
would spend a weekend in jail prior to release. 59 "Speaking of how federal
agents had ordered Hallinan to the floor at gunpoint inside his Marin County
home on August 6, and then forced him to spend a weekend in jail before he
could see a magistrate and post bond, former San Francisco Mayor Joseph L.
Alioto said, 'It's outrageous and vindictive.' " 60
According to many attorneys, the most striking aspect of the HallinanGrellman arrests was the government's aggressive and unprecedented attempt
to use federal forfeiture laws to confiscate the suspects' law firms. As spelled
out in the indictment, prosecutors used Title 21, Section 853(a) of the federal
drug-trafficking laws to go after the homes, offices and law practices of Hallinan and Grellman "[i]n what forfeiture experts say is the first seizure attempt
of its kind ." 61 The government has used forfeiture provisions aggressively in
recent years, but Hallinan's and Grellman's cases are unusual in that the government attempted to forfeit their law practices.6 2
55. Dolan, supra note 21, at I.
56. Dolan, supra note 21, at I.
57. Dolan, supra note 21, at I.
58. Howard Mintz, Hallinan Admits Mistakes Says Mancuso Exploited Them, TH E RECORDER, Mar.
I 0, 1995, at I.
59. Slind-Flor, supra note 29, at I.
60. Michael Checcio, Famed Lawyer's Arrest Shocks San Francisco, THE OREGONIAN, Sept. 5,
1993, at A23.
61. Slind-Flor, supra note 23, at 3.
62. "Typically in drug and racketeering cases, the government seeks the forfeiture of property used
to carry out a crime or property obtained with ill-gotten gains. While other businesses and partnerships
have been seized, the Hallinan and Grellman case is one of the first in which the government has sought
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The forfeiture request is bizarre because "[u]nlike most other seized businesses or property, which can be sold by the government, a law firm isn ' t worth
two cents without the lawyer running it."63 The only purpose critics have found
to justify the government's request to confiscate law firms would be to prevent
them from providing legal services.6 4
Accordingly, the government's attempt to seize the three-partner law firm of
Hallinan, and the solo practice of Grellman, is what makes "the case far from
routine - and, to defense lawyers , vindictive and ominous." 65
In the case of indicted lawyer Michael Abbell, critics maintain that he was
once again targeted by federal prosecutors in an effort to intimidate the defense
bar. 66 However, Abbell may also have been targeted because of his former
position as a high-ranking official in the Justice Department.
Abbell , considered one of the leading experts on extradition, worked for the
federal government for over seventeen years and once headed the Justice Department's office of international affairs. In this position, Abbell investigated
one of the Cali cartel's co-founders and learned many of the sophisticated techniques the government uses to seek out international drug suspects. 67 In 1984,
however, Abbell left his position at Justice and angered many federal employees when he began giving legal advice to reputed cartel leaders, advice which
included helping major drug suspects fight extradition. 68 Abbell ruffled more
federal feathers in 1988 when "he lobbied staff members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee to create amendments that would have made it harder to
extradite drug kingpins." 69 According to disgruntled Senator John Kerry, Abbell was wrongfully "providing expertise to major cocaine traffickers that he
obtained while he was working for the U.S. Justice Department." 70
The acquittal of Hallinan and the guilty pleas in the Abbell case neither prove
nor disprove allegations of governmental overreaching. Certainly, the timing of
Hallinan's arrest and efforts to secure a forfeiture of his law practice suggest
improper motive. But available records do not prove that the government is
targeting aggressive criminal defense lawyers to deter the defense bar from
zealous representation of their clients. However, those and other prosecutions
to take over a law firm." Wade Lambert, Defense Lawyers Decry Auempt to Seize Law Firms in Drug
Case, WALLST. J., Aug. 3 1, 1993, at B5.
63. Id .
64. Slind-Flor, supra note 23, at 3.
65. Checcio, supra note 60, at A23.
66. Brian McGrory, Cartel Arrests Shake the Miami Bar, BOSTONGLOBE,June 13, 1995, at I.
67. Torry, supra note 47, at A6.
68. Id .
69. Peter Bensinger, Crossing the Powdery White Line, THE FORTWORTHSTAR-TELEGRAM,
June
II , 1995, at 2.
70. Id.
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of prominent lawyers like Clinton friend Webster Hubbell demonstrate that the
government does not hesitate to investigate and prosecute lawyers.

III.

How

PRACTICING

LAW BECOMES

A RISKY BusINEss:

MAIL FRAUD

Some of the headline cases in which lawyers become criminal defendants
involve serious and unquestionable violations of the law. 71 No one can question
the need to prosecute a lawyer for passing along a death threat from a cartel
member to a witness against his client. But many criminal charges against lawyers involve conduct less obviously criminal and may involve behavior common within the profession. As developed in more detail below, giving legal
advice with an improper motive may violate federal law.n A potential inequity
arises when the lawyer's advice is the product of incompetence or negligence
rather than through willful or intentional misconduct. 73 Given that the government is willing to prosecute attorneys and in some instances seems eager to do
so, the profession must become aware of the myriad ways in which lawyers can
cross the line and become law violators. This section discusses some examples
of behavior that cross that line.
A. LIFE IMITATES ART OR SOMEBODY AT JUSTICE READS GRISHAM

This article opened by positing that most lawyers probably have difficulty
understanding how overbilling a client can become a federal offense. Especially during the 1980' s, when clients began shopping for legal services and
comparing hourly rates, many lawyers responded by double billing for legal
services. 74 Another common practice is charging a standard fee for a phone
call, typically, a quarter of an hour whether the call takes two or twelve minutes. Lawyers offer various justifications for those practices, some more convincing than others.
For example, client phone calls may interfere with an attorney's work on a
project; the actual time on the phone may not reflect the time it costs the attorney to start up the project interrupted by the call. 75 A similar explanation may
be offered for adding a charge for services, like copying, based on a percentage
of the bill rather than on actual costs. Actual costs may be expensive to keep
track of, requiring a notation every time a few pages are copied.
71. For example, Hallinan allegedly advised his client to get rid of a witness cooperating with the
government. Slind-Flor, supra note 23, at 3. Moran and Abbell are charged with identifying a confidential informant who was later murdered. Booth, supra note 44, at A I.
72. See discussion infra at notes 136-47.
73. See discussion infra at notes 141-47.
74. See William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS
L. REV. I. 37-38
(1991) (discussing billing for "recycled" work product).
75. Id. at 59 (describing practice of billing for small amounts of time); some lawyers explain
overbilling as a corrective for underbilling. see Hallye Jordan, Lawyers, Firm Facing Charges of
Overbilling, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 10, 1993, at 5.
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Further, even if improper, such charges may appear to the practitioner to be a
matter properly settled between attorney and client. Overbilling may be understood as a breach of contract, but hardly a crime. 76 Insofar as it involves unethical conduct (and here , as older lawyers remember when ethical codes required
certain minimum billing for services), one might believe that the matter is
within the purview of the state bar association. There, the appropriate remedy
might typically be a sanction short of disbarment, and certainly, far less than a
criminal penalty. 77
Even if seen as criminal, overbilling may seem like a matter for state criminal
law. The practice of law is uniquely within the control of the states which set
standards for the practice of law free from federal interference. 7 8
Those arguments are unavailing. John Grisham 's plot device in The Finn is
no longer the material of fiction. For example , in United States v. Crymes,
Hardie & Heer, the government's theory mirrored Mitch McDeere 's solution to
his dilemma, turning in the partners in his law firm without revealing client
confidences. 79 The indictment in Crymes, Hardie & Heer alleged, for example,
that members of the firm instructed the clerk responsible for firm billing to add
additional time to the firm's billing according to a pre-established schedule; that
the firm charged fifteen percent of each bill for out-of-pocket costs instead of
actual expenditures as represented to the client; and that member s of the firm
encouraged all of the lawyers, paralegals, law clerks, and secretaries to bill standardized minimum charges instead of actual time expended for various services
performed. Typically , Crymes, Hardie & Heer sent clients their bills through
the maiJ.80
Transforming that conduct into multiple federal crimes is remarkably easy for
a federal prosecutor. As observed by a former member of the U.S. Attorney's
office in charge of business fraud, "[t]o federal prosecutors of white collar
crime, the mail fraud statute is our Stradivarius , our Colt 45, our Louisville
Slugger, our Cuisinart - our true love."8 1 Section 1341, according to Mr.
Rakoff, is simple, adaptable and, for the experienced prosecutor, has a comfortable familiarity. 82
Before recent expansion of the mail fraud statute, it read, in relevant part:
Whoever , having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud ... places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter ,
76. See Ross, supra note 74 (describing wholesale acceptance of some forms of overbilling).
77. Ross, supra note 74, at 22-28 (describing amorphous guidelines to reasonable billing in codes of
professional responsibility).
78. See authorities cited supra note 7.
79. See Government's Trial Memo (filed Nov. 2, 1993) submitted in United States v. Crymes,
Hardie & Heer, No. 93-109 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
80. Id.
81. Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 18 DuQ. L. REv. 771, 771 (1980).
82. Id.
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any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service ...
shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both. 83

Enhanced penalties are available if the fraud affects a financial institution. 84 In
1994, Congress further expanded the sweep of the mail fraud statute in a little
noticed provision of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, by extending its provisions to cases that involve use of a "private or
commercial interstate carrier," 85 as well as those involving the U.S. Postal Service. Section 1343 includes a similar provision for cases in which the scheme
involves use of "wire, radio, or television communication."86
Thus, the elements of mai l fraud include a scheme to defraud, including an
intent to defraud and the use of the mails (or under the 1994 revision, the use of
a private interstate carrier). Originally modest in scope, 87 Congress almost cer tainly intended to limit the statute to cases in which some direct misuse of a
post office was established. 88 One recent commentator has argued, for example,
that "[i]t appears highly unlikely ... that Congress in 1872 believed that the
Federal Government should prosecute traditional state matters that did not involve directly the federal post office." 89 That is so because of then preva iling
constitutional problems that might arise from Congress interfering with matters
entrusted to the states, like regulation of fraud and the criminal law generally.
Hence, Congress probably intended that the direct exploitation of the post office
was a necessary element of the offense. 90
While doubts exist about Congress' original intent, the courts have not been
constrained in their construction of the statute. Instead, the mail and wire statutes have been the "first line of defense" against fraud. 91 The government has
used those statutes in cases of "consumer frauds, stock frauds, land frauds, bank
frauds, insurance frauds, and commodity frauds, [and] have [been] extended
even to such areas as blackmail, counterfeiting, election fraud, and bribery." 92
The government has used § 1341 in cases where legislatures have been slow to
83. 18 u.s.c.§ 1341 (1988).
84. Id. (providing for a possible fine of $1,000,000 or imprisonment of not more than 30 years or
both if the violation affects a financial institution).
85. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. I03-332, I 08 Stat. 1796.
The change to the mail fraud statute was not given widespread publicity undoubtedly because the main
provisions of the bill were far more politically volatile. For example, the same law provides for the
death penalty for a number of federal crimes and financed a number of crime prevention programs. See
Peter J. Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be Called Federal Fraud: The Changing Nature of the Mail
Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REV. 435, 436 (1995).
86. 18 u.s.c.§ 1343 (1988).
87. Henning, supra note 85, at 441.
88. Henning, supra note 85, at 441-42.
89. Henning , supra note 85, at 441-42.
90. Henning, supra note 85, at 442-43.
91. Rakoff, supra note 81, at 772.
92. Rakoff, supra note 81, at 772.
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act to fill a gap. As observed by one court, in explaining why Congress has not
attempted to define the term "defraud ," "to try to delimit 'fraud' by definition
would tend to reward subtle and ingenious circumvention ."93
Common law offenses, for example, like fraudulent pretenses were far narrower than mail fraud. Unlike fraudulent preten ses, the scheme to defraud may
relate to statements about future events .94 Indeed, in at least one instance, a
federal court has upheld a prosecution based on what were apparently a series
of technically true statement s. As the court stated in Lustiger v. United States ,
statements in a brochure advertising a land deal in Arizona may have been true,
but "could reasonably have led a person of average intelligence and experience
to believe that all parcel s offered for sale had reasonable access to a water supply. "95 Taken as a whole, statements that are misleading are actionable.
Even prior to the 1994 expansion of § 1341 to include private carriers, the
mailin g element was liberally construed. By contrast to what Congress probably intended, some direct abuse of the mail service, 96 the act has been interpreted so that the mailing element is satisfied even if it is not an essential part of
the scheme to defraud. 97 Instead, it is enough that the mailing be an incident to
an essential part of the scheme or a "step in [the] plot."98
A few examples demonstrate the loose connection between the scheme and
the use of the mails. For exa mple, in Schmuck v. United States, the defendant , a
wholesale used car dealer, routinely rolled back odometers of cars before he
sold the cars to retail dealers .99 The mailing took place after the sale was complete as part of the proce ss whereby the retail dealer made an application to the
state 's department of transportation for title to the vehicle. The Supreme Court
found that the mailing element was satisfied. It found that Schmuck's "scheme
. . . did not reach fruition until the retail dealers resold the cars and effected
transfers of title." 100 By contrast, had he not been a dealer engaged in multiple
trans actions, the scheme would have ended prior to the mailing. Only then
would the mailing not be an incident to the scheme. 10 1
93. Forshay v. United States, 68 F.2d 205, 2 11 (8th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 29 1 U.S. 674 (1934).
94. KATHLEEN F. BRI CKE Y, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLA R C RIME: CASES AND MA TE RIA LS I 1819 (2d ed. 1995).
95. Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132, 136 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
96. See Henning, supra note 85, at 442.
97. Periera v. United States, 347 U.S. I, 8 (1954).
98. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916); see also Schmuck v. United States, 489
U.S. 705 ( 1989).
99. Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 707, 711.
!00. Id. at 7 12.
10I. Id. at 7 11. There are also examples in which the mailing took place after the scheme to defraud
and in no way was an incident to the scheme. See. e.g., Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88 (1944 );
Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370 (1960); United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974). Even after the
scheme has come to an end without the use of the mails, a "lulling" letter to help avoid detection of the
scheme may satisfy the mail requirement. See United States v. Sampson, 37 1 U.S. 75 (1962).
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The use of the mails extends Congress ' power into matters otherwise beyond
its jurisdiction. For example, Congress lacks jurisdiction to regulate state tax
matters and typically exercises restraint when matters involving such issues are
otherwise within its jurisdiction. 102 Notwithstanding that fact, mail fraud
reaches schemes involving state tax matters when the mailing element has been
met. 103 As observed by the Supreme Court, Congress' power extends to the use
of the mails to execute the scheme even if it cannot forbid the underlying
scheme itself. 104
In light of the flexible or malleable nature of§ 1341, the government has had
no difficulty in charging lawyers with mail fraud based on padded bills. 105 The
scheme to defraud is to charge the client more than the fee would be if billing
were based on actual time spent on the client's work. 106 The client has received
legal services, presumably something of value. But critical to a scheme to defraud is whether the client received the bargained for value . As observed by
Judge Learned Hand, a person is defrauded when "he has lost his chance to
bargain with the facts before him." 107 Deceptive billing practices prevent the
client from making an informed decision about the true cost of legal services.
The use of the mail is obviously met as long as the law firm uses the mail to
send the bill. Courts have routinely found the mailing element met in similar
situations where either a bill was sent through the mails 108 or where the victim
of the scheme to defraud used the mail to send money or other property to the
defendant. 109
Finally, like the cases involving state taxation, 110 the argument that regulation of the bar is a matter of state power would be unavailing as well. Local
matters become federal matters upon the use of the mails. And as Mitch
McDeere observed, every mailing is a separate count of mail fraud. 11 1 The
prospects of criminal liability are truly frightening.
102. See Brickey, supra note 94, at 112; see also Rakoff. supra note 81, a1 778 (stating that when
faced with the question of whether the mail fraud statute violates constitutional limitations on Congress's power to regulate local fraud, courts have avoided the question by reasoning that mail fraud
regulates the use of the mails and that the gist or gravamen of the offense is not the regulation of fraud
per se).
103. See. e.g., United States v. Mirabile. 503 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973
(1975).
104. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393 (1916).
105. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 6.
I 06. The government must prove that the attorney did not explain the billing practices to the client.
see Government's Trial Memo, supra note 79.
107. United States v. Rowe, 56 F.2d 747, 749 (2d Cir. 1932).
108. See e.g., United States v. Perkal , 530 F.2d 604 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 821 (1976).
109. See. e.g., United States v. Roylance , 690 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Britton,
500 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1974).
110. See Brickey, supra, note 94, at 112; see also Illinois Dept. of Revenue v. Phillips. 771 F.2d 312
(7th Cir. 1985).
111. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391,394 (1916); see also Rakoff, supra note 81, at 777-78.
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B. OTHER WAYS TO COMMIT MAIL FRAUD

One of the more creative uses of the mail fraud statute has been the cases in
which the government has relied on the deprivation of loyal service to one's
employer. 112 A similar theory has allowed the government to expand its jurisdiction to cover acts of local bribery . 113 For example, in United States v.
Mandel, the government successfully prosecuted the governor of Maryland
based on his failure to disclose material information concerning state-regulated
enterprises. 114 According to the Fourth Circuit, this denied the citizens of their
right to honest and faithful execution of duties by the governor. 115 In some
cases, the intangible rights theory merely allowed the government to prevail
without making a detailed showing of the financial loss suffered by the employer.116 But in some cases, it was able to prevail where economic loss may
not have been proven. 117
In 1987, the Supreme Court rejected the intangible rights theory in McNa lly
v. United States. 11 s There, the public officials and high ranking members of the
Democratic party devised a scheme whereby an insurance brokerage agency
purchased insurance for the state in return for its agreement to kickb ack a percentage of its commissions to parties designated by the defendants. The government failed to demonstrate a financial loss to the state. 119
Contrary to all of the lower courts' interpretation of§ 1341, McNally held
that a scheme to defraud had to be one to obtain money or property. 120 As one
commentator has argued, McNally "vindicate[d] implicitly .. . the view that
several commentators and some dissenting judges had begun to articulate in the
112. See, e.g., United States v. George, 477 F. 2d 508 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 ( 1973);
United States v. Seigel, 717 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1983).
113. United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982) (political leader failed to disclose
information about scheme to kickback political contributions); United States v. Busch, 522 F.2d 641
(7th Cir. 1975) (city employee failed to disclose interest in company awarded municipal contracts) ,
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976).
114. 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), aff'd on reh' g, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en bane), cert. denied ,
445 U.S. 961 (1980).
115. Mandel , 591 F.2d at 1364.
116. See, e.g., Abbott v. United States, 239 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1956) (Fif1h Circuit stated that employer had suffered direct economic loss) .
117. See, e.g., United States v. Runnels, 833 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1987). As observed by Professor
Coffee: "[I]t seems unlikely that there was any economic loss caused by the agent's misconduct. A
union official took kickbacks from law firms to whom he referred workmen 's compensation cases ...
[b]ecause the fees that the law firms would receive were set by a state agency, it is doubtful that the
agent's gain came at the union members' expense." John C . Coffee, Jr., Hush!: The Criminal Status of
Confidential Information After McNaL/y and Carpenter and the Enduring Problem of Overcriminaliza tion, 26 AM. CRIM. L. Rev. 121, 128 (1988).
118. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
119. Id. at 360 (the government did not allege a financial loss).
120. Section 1341 provides that "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property" 18 U .S.C. § 1341. The Supreme Court, unlike lower courts, found that the legislative history and
the words "to defraud" require showing of harm to one's property rights. McNa/ly, 483 U.S. at 356-60.
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early 1980's: that the 'intangible rights' doctrine had resulted in serious overextension of the criminal law." 121 Permissive use of§ 1341 had blurred the line
between the criminal law and the civil law of fiduciary duties. 122
In 1988, Congress substantially reversed McNally when it enacted § 1346. 123
Section 1346 provides that a § 1341 or § 1343 scheme to defraud may be one
"to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." 124 Even before
enactment of § 1346, the Court had found that while intangible rights are not
protected by mail and wire fraud, intangible property does support a conviction
under those provisions. 12s
The use of mail fraud based only on deprivation of intangible rights raises
concern that only the prosecutor's restraint prevents "a serious overextension of
the criminal law, one that [leaves] no meaningful line between the civil law of
fiduciary duties and the criminal law of fraud." 126 As argued by Professor Coffee, "[b ]ecause the term 'fiduciary' essentially implies only a relationship based
on trust and confidence ... an interpretation that criminalizes all undisclosed
fiduciary breaches seemingly [gives] the mail and wire fraud statutes nearly
universal scope." 127
The broad application of mail and wire fraud is of special concern to lawyers.
Lawyers often possess confidential information belonging to their clients and to
third parties. Unauthorized use of such information (perhaps not even for personal gain) 128 violates federal fraud statutes whenever the lawyer uses the mail,
telephone or other electronic transmission as part of the dissemination of the
information or any other part of the scheme. 129
These are not merely theoretical musings. For example, in United States v.
Grossman, 13° the defendant was a lawyer in a firm that was preparing a recapitalization for one of its clients. During that time, one of the lawyers, not directly involved in the recapitalization plan, learned about the plan from a fellow
associate. He began calling friends and relatives, getting them to trade in the
stock. Not only did the government successfully prosecute under federal securities laws, but also got a conviction under the mail fraud statute. The Second
Circuit upheld the conviction and found, even apart from § 1346, that the infor121. Coffee, supra note I 17, at 127.
I 22. Coffee, supra note 117, at 127.
123. 18 u.s.c.§ 1346 (1988).
124. Id.
125. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
126. Coffee, supra note 117, at 127.
127. Coffee, supra note 117, at 127.
128. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 117, at 140 (arguing that under the Supreme Court's approach , a
whistleblower with noble social goals would be guilty of mail fraud).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Bronston ,
658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981).
130. 843 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1988).
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mation was within the meaning of intangible property consistent with the
Supreme Court's interpretation in McNally and Carpenter .131
Grossman is hardly a sympathetic case insofar as the lawyer's conduct obviously violated federal securities laws. But the same conduct gave rise to separate charges; punishment on both charges is constitutionally permissible. 13 2
Grossman is hardly the only case in which the government has targeted lawyers
for misusing clients' confidential information. 133 In the litigated cases, while
the lawyer has been motivated by personal gain, under the Court's analysis in
Carpenter, misuse of the confidential information alone constitutes the gravamen of the offense . 134
D. MAIL FRAUD AND THE PRACTICE

OF LAW

In the cases discussed above, 135 instances of overbilling and misuse of client
confidences, arguably, the lawyers engaged in questionable conduct not directly
related to the practice of law. That is not always the case in fraud claims. In
fact, many lawyers may be surprised that in any number of instances, the actus
reus of a federal crime is the performing of legal services or the giving of legal
advice. 136
Civil plaintiffs have used acts of mail fraud as the underlying predicate offenses to state a private right of action under the RICO statute, and frequently
named lawyers and other professionals as defendants. 137 In a number of cases,
plaintiffs have alleged that attorneys have helped develop fraudulent schemes
involving promised tax shelters that have later been declared improper by the
IRS. 138 While some courts have rejected those allegations as sufficient to state
a claim under RICO, properly analyzed, a lawyer furthering a fraudulent
scheme by preparing a legal document should not be immune from criminal
liability. 1 3 9
131. Grossman, 843 F.2d at 85-86.
I 32. United States v. Dowling, 739 F.2d 1445 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd in part, 473 U.S. 207 (1985).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Bronston, 658 F. 2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981).
134. Coffee, supra note 117, at 138-42.
135. See discussion supra notes 79-134.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Cintolo, 818
F.2d 980 (l st Cir. 1987).
137. Ralph Pitts, Michael R. Smith & Reginald R. Smith, Civil RICO and Professional Liability
after Reves: Plaintiffs Will Have to look Elsewhere to Reach the 'Deep Pockets ' of Outside Professionals, 9 Crv. RICO REP. 1, l (1993).
138. See, e.g., Nolte v. Pearson, 994 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1993); Sasson v. Altgeist, 777, Inc., 822 F.
Supp. 1303 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Adler v. Berg Harmon Associates, 816 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
139. See Michael Vitiello, More Noise from the Tower of Babel: Making 'Sense' Out of Reves v.
Ernest & Young, 56 Omo ST. L.J. 1363 (1995) (arguing that lower courts have misconstrued the
Supreme Court's decision in Reves); see also G. Robert Bakey and Marc Haefner, Did Reves Give
Professionals a Safe-Harbour Under RICO ?, 9 C1v. RICO REP. I, 3-4 (1993) (arguing that professionals are fully liable in cases like that described above under§ 1962(d) or aiding and abetting). Outside
the RICO -mail fraud context, lawyers are criminally liable for fraudulently prepared legal documents.
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In such a case, the actus reus of the crime of mail fraud may be the giving of
professional advice. The lawyer's contribution to the scheme is the rendering
of a legal opinion that the proposed scheme satisfies federal tax law. Any
thought that a lawyer has an immunity from the criminal law when his conduct
consists merely of performing legal services is simply wrong. 140
What turns the ordinary practice of law criminal is the lawyer's mental
state. 141 For example, in the case of the tax shelter cases, the lawyer must have
been aware that the scheme was fraudulent. If charged with aiding and abetting, a defendant must have an intent to advance the criminal scheme of the
primary defendant. 142 In various contexts, the mens rea is satisfied by a showing of knowledge.143
In the tax shelter case , the lawyer may have acted without the requisite
knowledge. For example, the attorney may have been negligent in her understanding of current tax regulations. Negligence or malpractice is not mail fraud
because there would be no intent to defraud. 144 But the mens rea of mail fraud
may not be sufficient protection for those accused of fraudulent conduct, because of the way in which a prosecuting party proves fraudulent intent. As I
have argued elsewhere, "(i]n a fraud case, the plaintiff will seldom have a
's moking gun' on the intent to defraud. Few defendants will admit that they
acted consciously to deceive the victim of the fraud." 145 Because a lawyer has
special knowledge, the prosecutor will invite the jury to infer the mens rea from
the defendant's conduct in preparing the memo in support of the tax shelter. 146
If a competent attorney would have known that the shelter was improper, the
jury may be allowed to infer guilty knowledge.1 41
see, e.g., United States v. Benjamin , 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964). At least one federal district court has
upheld as sufficient allegations that lawyer s co mmitted mail fraud by their preparation of workers'
co mpen sation claims. The pleadings alleged additional conduct by the lawyer s, but a key element of
the mail fraud-RICO claim was what might otherwise be c hara cterized as the practice of law. see
Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, 869 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
140. See HAZARDET AL., supra note 7, at 67.
141. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964); see also HAZARDET AL. supra note 7,
at 66-67; Vitiello, supra note 139.
142. The men s rea for accomplice liability is satisfied only upon a showing of intent. see JOSHUA
DRESSLER,UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINALLAW 44) (2d ed. 1995).
143. Indeed, in some cases, the mens rea element is proven by willful blindness. see Benjamin, 328
F.2d at 862 (the mens rea element may be satisfied in a case in which a lawyer "shut[s] [his] eyes to
what was plainly to be seen.").
144. 18 U .S.C. § 1341 is explicit that a defendant must have an intent to defraud. see also Durland
v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896) (identifying the significant fact as intent and purpose); see
generally 2 KATHLEENBRICKEY,CORPORATECRIMINALLIABILITY,§ 8.31 (2d ed. 1991). Some courts
have found recklessness to be sufficient. see, e.g., United States v. Schaflander, 719 F.2d 1024 (9th
Cir. 1983).
145. Vitiello, supra note 139, at 1385.
146. See, e.g., United States v. Fuel, 583 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Seasholtz, 435
F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521 (I Ith Cir. 1986).
147. Vitiello, supra note 139, at 1384-86 .
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V. COMPOUNDING
THE RISK: MAIL FRAUDANDRICO

Above, I have suggested a number of ways in which a lawyer may violate
§ 1341 by committing acts in connection with the practice of law. In this section, I explore how multiple acts of mail fraud may compound the attorney's
criminal and civil exposure.
The lawyer's exposure is multiplied because mail fraud is what is colloquially known as a predicate offense for a RICO violation. 148 RICO is not just one
of the most potent federal criminal statutes because it authorizes long prison
terms and forfeiture. 149 It also creates a private right of action and includes
treble damages and allows the prevailing plaintiff to recover attorneys fees.1 50
Enacted in 1970 to fight organized crime,151 RICO has been used in contexts
having nothing to do with the Mafia. 152 A number of business groups and numerous commentators and judges have lamented its use in cases involving what
amounts to local fraud, converted into a federal right of action because mail
fraud is among the predicate offenses. 153
RICO consists of four offenses. One involves the use of racketeering proceeds to invest in an enterprise; 154 a second makes it unlawful for a defendant to
take over an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering. 155 Those provisions
have been used rarely.1 5 6 The most frequently used provision is§ 1962(c), providing that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or
collection of unlawful debt." 157 The fourth RICO is offense is a conspiracy
provision. 158
148. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (" 'racketeering activity'" means any of the specifically identified
offense s).
149. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (providing criminal penalties including forfeiture of assets).
150. 18 u.s.c.§ 1964.
151. See Michael Vitiello , Has the Supreme Court Really Turned RICO Upside Down?: An E:wmination of NOW v. Scheidler, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1223, 1233-37 (1995).
152. See Sedima , S.P.R.L . v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985); H.J. Inc. v. Northwes1em Bell Telephone , 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
153. See, e.g., Susan Ge1zendanner, Judicial 'Pruning ' of 'Garden Variety Fraud ' Civil RICO Cases
Does Not Work: It's Time for Congress to Act, 43 YAND. L. REv. 673, 674-75 (1990); William J.
Hughes, RICO Reform: How Much is Needed ?, 43 YAND. L. REv. 639, 642 (1990).
154. 18 U.S.C. § I 962(a).
155. 18 u.s.c. § 1962(b).
156. See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 CoLUM. L. REv.
66 1, 726-27 (1987).
157. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
158. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
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In the Grisham example of the overbilling law firm, a prosecutor or plaintiff
whose injury is proximately caused 159by the defendant's conduct could allege
all of the elements of a RICO offense under § l 962(c). The law firm itself
readily satisfies the enterprise element. 160 The lawyer is obviously employed
by or associated with the enterprise.161
The defendant must conduct the affairs of the enterprise through the pattern
of racketeering. The pattern element is not defined, but the statute provides that
it consists of at least two acts of racketeering. 162Congress specified the meaning of "acts of racketeering." Section 1961(I) provides a list of specific offenses that constitute "racketeering activity." 163 One of the enumerated
offenses is mail fraud. 164
While § 1961 does not define "pattern," the Supreme Court has held that
"pattern" is more than the mere commission of two acts of racketeering. 165 As
the Court held in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone, the offenses must
demonstrate continuity and relatedness. 166 But in the case that I have described,
the case of routine overbilling, both would be satisfied. Relatedness is easily
met in light of the similarity of the offenses. Continuity is satisfied in one of
two situations described by H.J. Inc. If the scheme has been completed, the
scheme must have taken place over a substantial period of time. 167 That involves obvious line drawing but certainly if the challenged conduct has taken
place over a period of a year or more, the continuity standard is met. If the
period is short, for example , because it is interrupted by the lawsuit or indictment, pattern may be established as long as the government can demonstrate
that the scheme would continue into the future. 168 Certainly, repeated acts of
overbilling would satisfy the pattern requirement unless the scheme was interrupted early.
159. The Supreme Court has found that a plaintiff must prove that its damages were proximately
caused by a defendant's racketeering activity. Holmes v. Securities Inv. Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258
( 1992).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) defines "enterpri se" as including "a ny individual, partner ship, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a
legal entity." The Supreme Court has given liberal interpretation to the "enterprise " concept. See
NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
161. At times, courts have extended the "associated with" language well beyond a partner or member of the organization. see. e.g., United States v. Yonan, 800 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1055 (1987) .
162. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) provides, in relevant part, that " 'pattern of racketeering ' requires at least
two acts of racketeering activity."
163. 18 u.s.c.§ 1961(1).
164. Id.
165. H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel., 492 U.S. 229, 237-39 (1989).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 242 (party may "demonstrate continuity over a closed period by proving a series of
related predicates extending over a substantial period of time).
168. Id. (liability may depend on threat of continuity).
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The interstate commerce element has not proven to be a significant limitation
on the use of RICO. Courts in RICO cases, as in most federal crimes, have
given very liberal interpretation to that requirement. 169 Courts have not required any proof that any of the activity occurred in or affected interstate commerce. The prosecutor or plaintiff needs to show only that the enterprise itself
has some involvement with interstate commerce. 17 For example, in one case,
the court found the interstate commerce element satisfied because a local district attorney's office bought supplies in interstate commerce. 171 Even more
obvious in the hypothetical law firm case, the element would be satisfied
through the use of the mails and an interstate telephone system.172

°

IV.

CONCLUSION

I started with the premise that the government unquestionably considers lawyers as suitable targets for white collar criminal investigations. 173 Obviously, it
is appropriate to criminalize criminals, even if they are lawyers. But targeting
lawyers raises a number of important concerns.
Prosecutorial discretion is virtually unreviewable. 174 Misuse of that power
can be used in subtle and invisible ways to intimidate criminal defense lawyer s.
This is especially true in cases involving any number of federal crimes, like
mail fraud, where the statute, even as admitted by its proponents, is amorphous. 17 s In the case of overbilling, a related problem arises: defendants are
virtually foreclosed from raising claims of selective enforcement of the law.176
This may leave hidden from public scrutiny an improper motive by the government in targeting one lawyer as opposed to another. As argued above, the Hallinan case looks like one in which the government may have timed his arrest to
make it difficult for him to secure a timely release from custody, a scenario
suggestive of governmental agents intent on punishing Hallinan. 177 But the
169. See, e.g., R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that nexus
with interstate commerce required by RICO is minimal); see also United States v. Conn, 769 F.2d 420
(7th Cir. 1985) (purchase of office supplies and equipment from companies outside the state was sufficient to meet the interstate commence element).
170. See, e.g ., United States v. Conn. 769 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1985).
171. United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5 (4th Cir. 1980).
172. See, e.g., United States v. Muskovsky, 863 F.2d 1319 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1067
(1988) (use of telephone sufficient); Cadle Co. v. Schultz, 779 F. Supp. 392 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (use of
mails sufficient). The Supreme Court has recently underscored that the interstate commerce element is
satisfied by making purchases out of state. See United States v. Robertson , 115 S. Ct. 1732 (1995).
173. See discussion supra at notes 4-5.
174. See Jones v. White, 992 F.2d 1548, 1571 (I Ith Cir. 1993) (holding that defendant must show
selective prosecution and selection motivated by "constitutionally invidious" criteria! like race or religion); see also Vitiello, supra note 151, at 1254 (raising concern about overbroad use of RICO).
175. See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 81, at 771-72 .
176. See sources cited supra note 174.
177. See discussion supra at notes 19-22.
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public never learns whether the government may have had an improper motive
in selecting him as a target of investigation.
Aggressive prosecution of attorneys raises other concerns. For example, the
Supreme Court has held that a lawyer's office is entitled to no special Fourth
Amendment protection. 178 This raises serious concerns about the confidentiality between the attorney and client. For example, in a case in which government agents are executing a search warrant for evidence of overbilling, the
scope of the search would take them into client legal files. 179 Presumably, the
searching officers would have to stop reading documents that did not pertain to
overbilling, but a cursory examination of a document to ascertain its content
allows the officer to learn something about the document's confidential information.180 We have been assured in a related context that the government cannot take advantage of that kind of information, 181but it may be difficult indeed
to show that the government took advantage of information that it may have
discovered during the course of a search.
Insofar as mail fraud may become a vehicle for the government to regulate,
selectively, the practice of law, this essay has canvassed a few specific concerns. I want to highlight one final concern . As indicated above, proponents of
the mail fraud statute applaud its amorphous nature because it prevents the calculating perpetrator of fraudulent schemes from evading its provisions. 182 But
that kind of creative prosecutorial use of mail fraud also means that in many
instances, defendant s are swept into its provisions without any indication that
the legislature has intended to criminalize the conduct at issue.

178. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
179. Presumably , the official executing the warrant is authorized to look anywhere that evidence
may be found. Billing information almo st certai nly would be found in a client's file.
180. Cf United States v. Hillyard, 677 F.2d 1336, 1342 (9th Cir. 1982) (allowing perusal of documents if the police have reasonable suspicion).
181. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (refusing to find per se violation of the Sixth
Amendment when undercover agent attended pretrial meetings between a defendant and his lawyer).
182. See discussion supra at notes 91-93.

